The presidency of John F. Kennedy (1961–1963) witnessed one of the tensest periods in the Cold War. This period oversaw greater competition between the two Cold War superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union for ideological superiority. This intertwined with the unstoppable wave of decolonisation that saw the emergence of newly formed nation-states. Once gained independence, many of these newly emerged countries attempted to advocate a middle way between the two rival blocs, which in turn served as proxies for a much wider conflict for supremacy of opposing ideas and socio-economic models concentrated in several hot spots around the world. One of these hot spots was Laos. Whilst one of the lesser-known foreign policy crises of the Kennedy Administration, between 1961 and 1962, it was the first major foreign policy crisis for the young president and his Administration, in which their attitudes and decisions toward it had significant strategic implications.
In the final years of the outgoing Eisenhower Administration (1953–1961), a political and military crisis erupted in the small and impoverished Southeast Asian kingdom of Laos between three competing factions in the country. These factions included the U.S.-backed conservative Royal Lao regime led by Phoumi Nosavan, the communist Pathet Lao supported by the Soviet Union and North Vietnam, and the neutralists led by Prince Souvanna Phouma. As a demonstration of a departure from the previous administration, which favoured military intervention into Laos, Kennedy and his team decided on neutralising Laos, which seemed an unlikely solution during a time of heightened Cold War tensions. This action eventually resulted in the United States signing and ratifying the 1962 Geneva Accords that internationally legitimised the neutralisation of Laos.
Even though scholarship on the attitudes of the Kennedy Administration toward the Laos crisis is not as extensive as that of Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, however, within the expanding historiography, there is still a worthwhile debate regarding the Administration’s decision to opt for neutralisation. Some historians, such as Lawrence Freedman, have argued that this was because of his reluctance to engage in another overseas military adventure after the outcome of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961. This in which, his confidence in military advices was ‘an undoubted casualty of Operation Zapata.’1 Other scholars have viewed the pursuit of a neutralist government in Laos as an example of flexibility in the decision-making process within the Administration, which distinguished Kennedy and his advisors from their predecessors and successors to an extent. In particular, Edmund F. Wehrle saw that the Laos experience demonstrated to Kennedy the value of risk and compromise to strive towards a negotiated settlement whilst circumventing entrenched interests.2 This contributes to the emphasis on the hagiography of the Kennedy presidency whilst at the same time, contributes to the counterfactual of whether Kennedy would have escalated in Vietnam as Lyndon Johnson did later on.
To contribute to the expanding historiography, this study will advance the argument that the Kennedy Administration’s primary motive for accepting the neutralisation formula eventually agreed at Geneva was from a point of weakness and the need to retreat to and concentrate on more strategically worthwhile position such as South Vietnam in the containment of international communism. In the process, this study will examine the extent to which endorsement of neutralisation by the Administration was based on their perceptions of Laos and its people through an Orientalist prism. This is in which, infantilisation and feminised generalisation of the country’s population from an elite masculine viewpoint resulted in viewpoints of Laos not being worthwhile allies in the wider Cold War strategic calculation.
In addition to the secondary literature, this study has made use of declassified government documents and sources within the concerned timeline to examine the decision-making process in the Kennedy Administration on the situation in Laos. These have been used to identify conflicts, problems and options presented to the Administration whilst pursuing neutralisation to see the underlying motivations that led to those particular decisions. The limitations of these sources were that certain elements remained classified, which limited the scope of understanding the historical context of motivations in pursuing neutralisation.
Other sources used included memoirs from former members of the Kennedy Administration who played vital roles in realising the final solution on the neutralisation of Laos. This included the one by Roger Hilsman, one of the New Frontiersmen in the Administration at the time. It was interesting to examine the inner working of the Administration toward the formulation of policy on Laos and his influence behind President Kennedy’s decision-making process. One of its limitations is that it was published during the Vietnam War and before opening of archival sources, which provided opportunities for re-writing history and his own responsibility. Another memoir by Walt Rostow, also key advisor in the Administration, was useful in looking at his interpretation of changes in policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy. At the same time, former Under-Secretary of State George Ball’s memoir was limited in terms of his interest in the Laotian question or lack thereof, and more emphasis on Vietnam.3 In general, due to the limited nature of memoirs in isolation, several were used and cross- examined with declassified documents to bypass writers’ exaggerations.
In order to advance the argument put forward, the first chapter of this study will provide the long term and immediate historical context of the crisis leading up to Kennedy’s presidency. An overview of the key players and their role in U.S.’s decision-making will be explored.
3 George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs/George W. Ball (New York: Norton, 1982): p.363.
This is where the influence of Orientalist angle in Administration’s pre-Geneva initiatives for neutralisation will be examined.
The second chapter will mainly analyse the options presented to Kennedy as part of the overall diplomatic and military manoeuvres to ensure neutrality on U.S. terms and in case of collapse of Geneva negotiations. This will be done through looking at policy options such as SEATO Plan 5 for joint military operation, and the possibility of partition of Laos and the factors that hindered their execution. In addition, the role of allies and rivals such as the Soviet Union regarding the Laos question in the formulation of U.S. policy will be determined. From there, it will hopefully expose the disagreements between various governmental departments, such as between States and Defense, and their entrenched interests.
The third and final chapter will determine the reasons behind Kennedy’s eventual patronage of a neutralist formula with Souvanna Phouma at its head, as eventually agreed at Geneva and the abandonment of Phoumi Nosavan. In particular, this including covering the Administration’s involvement in controversies such as the composition of the Laotian coalition cabinet and the impact of the Nam Tha debacle on the military questions in Laos and final negotiations at Geneva.
In summary, this study will examine the complex decision-making process of the Administration and evaluate their successes and failures in achieving neutralisation on their terms in order to resolve the crisis in Laos. Finally, to constitute a response to whether the Kennedy Administration’s actions in Laos was that of flexible crisis management or a retreat in the containment of international communism during a times of heightened Cold War superpower tensions.
(To be continued)
1 Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 300.
2 Edmund F. Wehrle, “A Good, Bad Deal”: John F.Kennedy, W. Averell Harriman, and the Neutralization of Laos, 1961–1962,” Pacific Historical Review 67.3 (August 1998): p. 376.
