The traditional narrative of the Indian independence movement has often focused on the nationalist leadership of the Indian National Congress and the personality of Gandhi in guiding India towards independence by 1947. However, it is important to realise that there were a divergence of interests and visions within a wide range of ideological spectrum that, one way or another, influenced the direction of the independent movement throughout its history. A particular example was Communism and its advocates, including members of the historically clandestine Communist Party of India (CPI). In order to thoroughly assess the role and influence of Communism within the independence movement, it is vital to understand that Communism as an ideology and alternative socio-economic model to Western capitalism arguably had a wider impact upon the anti-colonial movement than the Communist Party of India. In the context of the Indian struggle for independence, the success of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia had a tremendous impact upon the colonised regions and its populace, particularly among intellectuals and activists such as Bhagat Singh. In addition, the League Against Imperialism of 1927 in Brussels and the rapid industrialisation of the Soviet Union also inspired nationalist leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru to incorporate communistic elements in their vision for post-colonial India. On the other hand, the Communist Party of India had historically struggled to gain legitimacy within the wider national struggle due to several factors. These included fundamental organisational weaknesses, government repression as seen through the Meerut Conspiracy Case from 1929 to 1933, being susceptible to external influences through its British counterparts and Communist International, which hindered its national legitimacy and disagreements with the Indian National Congress during the inter-war period and beyond. Therefore, there is a need for examination of the role and influence of Communism in India in its theoretical and physical form, with regards to the CPI, within the wider struggle for independence. This would be done through examining case studies and writing from both Communist and non-Communist perspectives to further understanding of the impact of Communism had on the Indian endeavour for self-determination.
In order to understand the role and influence of Communism within the independence movement as a whole, it is important to gain an overview of the early history and ideological foundation of Indian Communism and their attitudes to the burgeoning nationalist movement. The success of the Bolshevik October Revolution in 1917 in Russia had a profound impact upon interested observers in the colonial world, and India was no exception. It was particularly receptive amongst India’s intellectuals who espoused anti-colonial sentiments. At the same time, the Bolshevik leaders also took an interest in India as a potential source of revolutionary activities in the colonised world. This was shown through a report broadcasted by Soviet wireless stations of a ‘memorandum’ handed to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets by an unnamed Indian delegation, which called for Russian assistance in liberating India.[1] A Bolshevik commentator, Kerzhentsev, writing in 1919, emphasised the revolutionary potential of India due to its position as the “most profitable” of all the British colonies and if emancipated, would not only weaken Britain’s wealth and influence but also spread revolutions across the colonial world and further afield.[2] Thereby, it can be seen that there was a strong interest in spreading communist revolutionary ideals to India. On the part of Indian activists, the success of the Bolshevik Revolution provided an alternative venue for support for their struggle. During the First World War, there were Indian émigré groups originally looked to Germany for support in their anti-British endeavours via armed revolutions, however, with the defeat of Germany by 1919, this was not realised which led to the switch to Bolshevik Russia.[3] The most notable of the activists was M.N. Roy who later became the leading spokesman for Indian communists. From this, there was a mutual interest between the Bolsheviks and interested Indian anti-colonial activists.
In terms of theoretical foundation, one of the fundamental hindrances to form a cohesive strategy toward communist revolution in a colonised country such as India was the question of bourgeoisie- led nationalist movements. According to Vladimir Lenin, the Bolshevik leader, in his Theses on the National and Colonial Questions drafted for the Second Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1920, Communist parties in ‘more backward countries and nations’ should assist the respective ‘bourgeois-democratic liberation movement’ in these countries.[4] It is important to be aware that in India at this point, the main focus of Indian nationalism revolved around the Indian National Congress, initially an elite organisation with a moderate outlook, but with the emergence of Gandhi on the political scene, Congress was transformed into a mass movement that sought to achieve its objectives through non-violence direct action in satyagraha. While it was not the only political entity in India, it was the largest and most well-organised advocate of Indian aspirations for self-determination. Thereby, represented an opportunity and obstacle to the development of a Communist movement in a colonised country with existing anti-imperialist apparatus such as India as stated in Lenin’s Theses. This approach was opposed by M.N. Roy, who argued in his Supplementary Theses on the National and Colonial Question that in ‘dependent’ countries, there are two distinct movements which are becoming further apart, the ‘bourgeois democratic nationalist movement’ and ‘mass action of the ignorant and poor peasants and workers.’ Moreover, the former, whilst attempting to control the latter, does not represent the aspiration of the masses. Thus, the Comintern should not endorse cooperation with the nationalist movements and do more to assist the development of Communist parties in these territories to lead the masses.[5] Thereby, it can be seen that the fundamental agreement between Lenin and Roy was on strategy and tactics, particularly surrounding approaches to existing bourgeois-led national movements such as Congress, which Lenin believed to be anti-imperialism and no concrete Communist-led alternatives existed in India at the time.
Roy’s opposition to collusion with Congress was founded in his past adherence to revolutionary terrorism and the fact that he was abroad for an extended period of time also made him out of touch with the political reality.[6] The dismissal of the importance of bourgeois-led nationalist organisations could be seen as a delaying factor in the development and organisation of an Indian communist movement. At the same time, Gandhi’s political potential was not recognised by India communists early on as Gandhism was described by Roy in his 1922 book India in Transition, as “the most acutest and most desperate manifestation of the forces of reaction.”[7] However, this did not mean M.N. Roy did not attempt to influence the nationalist movement, as prescribed by the Comintern, whilst attempting to dismiss Congress in order to prove his point. This was based on the fact Congress itself was a heterogeneous organisation with a wide divergence of interests and ideologies represented. After the abandonment of Non-Cooperation by Gandhi in 1922, Roy sought the support of a faction within Congress led by C.R. Das, which challenged Gandhi’s leadership, to influence the political thinking and socio-economic programme of Congress. At the Gaya Congress of 1922, S.A. Dange and S. Chettiar, proclaimed themselves to be communists and presented Roy’s program for radical socio-economic reforms.[8] The program called for abolition of land-lordism, nationalisation of public utilities, minimum wages, eight-hour working day, and free, compulsory education.[9] However, the Gaya Congress rejected Roy’s programme, which implied a clear defeat for the Communists in capturing the national movement whilst reaffirming its faith in Gandhi’s leadership and his policy of non-cooperation.[10] Even so, it provided Roy with evidence for Congress’s lack of revolutionary prowess, which would later prove to be an error in judgement and the need for establish a genuine mass revolutionary party in India.
Despite this, it is important to distinguish the role and influence of Communism as an ideology and the actual organisation of Communism in India within the independence movement as whole during different stages of the movement. Between 1922 and 1927, organisationally, the Communists were sporadic at best and lacked coordination, hampered by several factors. Even though the Communist Party of India (CPI) was founded in Tashkent in 1920 after the second Comintern Congress, a Central Committee was not elected until 1925 at the first conference of the CPI in Kanpur.[11] Furthermore, its organisation was hindered by internal rivalries within the handful of Indian communists, particularly between M.N. Roy and Indian émigré in Berlin, primarily Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, which failed in forming a unified organisation.[12] It can be said that this led to the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) to have a bigger say in the organisation of the CPI, which reduced the latter’s all-Indian credentials. A significant factor that limited the prospects for the organisation of Communist activities in India was heavy repression by the colonial government, who was alarmed by the potential effects that the Bolshevik Revolution might have on its colonies, especially India whilst entities such as the Indian National Congress were permitted to operate due to its relatively moderate outlook during this period. This is shown by the Kanpur Conspiracy Case between 1923 and 1924 where four leading Communists were accused of conspiring to overthrow the colonial government.[13] The case successfully crippled Communist movement as it removed leading and capable Communists from the scene and deterred potential recruits due to fear of persecution and imprisonment. This contributed to delaying the CPI from becoming a genuine political force in India during the struggle for independence. However, India Communists had some successes with the formation of Workers and Peasants’ Parties (WPPs), which was to provide a cover for Communist activities and lay the foundation for a vanguard revolutionary party for the working masses of India, including urban industrial workers and the rural peasantry. It was more successful with urban industrial workers as the major centre of communist activity was concentrated along major urban industrial centres such as Bombay, Calcutta and Kanpur. This allowed the CPI to have considerable influence in terms of organising industrial actions and strikes, as shown by the fact that between 1924 and 1929, the number of workers involved and working days lost due to strikes and disputes increased by nearly a hundred percent.[14] Furthermore, the programmes of various WPPs spoke of cooperation with other political trends in Congress, in terms of combining the goals of anti-imperialism and achieving minimum demands for the working class and peasantry. This allowed some influence for the Communists, with some members of the WPP elected to the All India Congress Committee (AICC) and provincial Congress Committees.[15]Despite its successes with industrial workers, one of the shortcoming of the WPPs was its failure to engage with the agrarian question, which arguably was crucial to the success of the organisation since unlike urban workers, the rural peasantry made the majority of the population and would have contributed to transforming the WPPs into a truly revolutionary organisation. Thus, Communism in its organisational form failed to make a breakthrough between 1922 and 1927 due to the aforementioned factors. Furthermore, the Communists patronage of violence continued to drive a wedge between them the non-violence direction of Congress under Gandhi. However, it can be seen Communism as an ideology and variants of it was beginning to have an influence over certain Indian independence activists, particularly from 1927 onwards.
A prime case of this was the experience of Jawaharlal Nehru in Brussels in 1927, when he participated at the Comintern-organised Congress of Oppressed Nationalities, representing Congress. This was considered an ideological turning point for Nehru, in which he was persuaded by Lenin’ theory on imperialism and the need for an alliance of anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist forces. Organisationally, this led to Nehru’s recommendation for the Indian National Congress to be affiliated to the League Against Imperialism, the outcome of the Brussels conference, and became a member of its executive committee and honorary president. After Brussels, Nehru and his father Motilal were invited to Moscow in the Soviet Union to attend the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, in which the successes of the Soviet experiment left a significant impression on Nehru, in common with many members of the colonial intelligentsia at this point.[16] However, this experience did not mean Nehru was entirely converted to Communism as he was impressed by the ‘tremendous changes taking place in Russia’ but deterred by ‘their (Communists’) dictatorial ways, their aggressive and rather vulgar methods, their habit of denouncing everybody who did not agree with them.’[17] It can be said that Nehru’s exposure to Communism allowed him to lay out the framework of a vision for a more socialistic post-colonial Indian society, something was not possible in previous years of Congress leadership of the nationalist movement as the goal had been an ambiguous Gandhian vision of swaraj (self-rule) without a coherent strategy for development once that is attained. Thereby, tilting Congress towards the left. Furthermore, in this sense, Communism, or certain elements of it and the goal of a more socialistic society were influential within the independence movement in providing a solution to the contemporary problems of colonial India. At the same time, he was aware the Russian model could not be wholeheartedly adapted to the conditions in India.
This also led to greater sympathy towards Indian communists from Nehru and other nationalists during the Meerut Conspiracy Case of 1929. The Meerut Conspiracy Case involved the arrest of thirty one Communists and trade unionists, whom were to be tried in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, on the charge of engaging in conspiring to ‘deprive the king-emperor of his sovereignty over India’ and involved all leaders of the CPI and trade unions.[18] During the three-year long trial, considered of the most costly in Asia at this time, Nehru contributed to the proceedings as a counsel for the defence.[19] The Conspiracy proved to be an opportunity and hindrance for Indian Communism. Opportunistically, it created martyrs out of the imprisoned Communists and their defendants, which were prevalent in Indian politics at the time and useful for propaganda purposes. On the hand, it was a hindrance as it continued to cripple the organisational apparatus of the CPI which were affected by previous instances of government repression and the imprisonment of its leadership resulted in the virtual disintegration of the WPPs.[20] Even more so, the appeal of radical left-wing ideology and politics, increased particularly amongst a younger generation of Indian independence fighters between 1929 and 1931, which served as a turning point in the independence movement, with the launching of the Civil Disobedience movement and affirmation of national independence as a goal by Congress. One prime example was the case of Bhagat Singh, who was arrested and sentenced for life imprisonment for throwing a bomb onto the floor of the central legislature on April 1929 and convicted of murder for the murder of a British official committed before his murder and was hanged on March 1931. During his imprisonment, he was exposed to Communist ideology and called for a revolution that would establish the “sovereignty of the proletariat” in his statement to the court at his trial. His martyrdom made him a national hero and was used by the CPI for propaganda purposes on the ground of his connection to Ajoy Ghosh, later general secretary of the CPI. [21] The cases of Nehru and Bhagat Singh showed the increased appeal and sympathy to Communist ideology and practices by Indian nationalists from all spectrum, which would have allowed Communism and its practitioners to have a larger share of leadership in the independence movement. However, organisational weaknesses and Comintern influence as a result of directives issued at the end of 1929 from the Sixth Congress advocating an ultra-leftist course, led to the CPI unable to capture the independence movement and continued its opposition to the Indian National Congress, Gandhi and Nehru in particular, who was compelled to leave the League Against Imperialism.[22] At the same time, this not result in the abandonment of communistic ideals by Nehru. This was shown in December 1933, in which he wrote that “…There is no middle road between Fascism and Communism. One has to choose between the two and I choose the Communist ideal.”[23]Thus, it not only does show an awareness of external development in the interwar period of the advent of Fascism, it shows the appeal of Communism as an ideology and a goal as perceived by Nehru.
The turn of event after the Sixth Comintern Congress also showed the significant role of external influence such as the Comintern played in limiting the legitimacy of the CPI within the independence movement, in which the CPI was unable to move beyond ideological adherence to take advantage of the Indian political realities at the time. The organisational weakness of the CPI, exacerbated by heavy government repression, made it dependent on Comintern support and susceptible to development in the Soviet Union whilst being oblivious to the development in India. This led to political isolation of the CPI between 1931 and 1934, in which they continued to undermine the independence movement under Congress leadership which was underway with Civil Disobedience rather than advocating cooperation. According to Shashi Joshi, the Communists were preoccupied with the politics of ‘domination’ rather than ‘hegemony’, thus, sought to gain absolute leadership of all the revolutionary forces which contributed to their inability to perceive Nehru’s position within Congress and subsequently, critical attacks of Nehru and Congress during this period.[24] Furthermore, from 1934 until 1942, the CPI was declared illegal, after attempted to organise a country-wide strike, along with Communist-controlled trade unions and the Young Workers’ League, forcing CPI to go undeground.[25] However, left-wing ideology still held sway in Indian nationalist politics during this period, in which some historians attributed to lack of in-depth understanding, with the exception of a few personalities such as Nehru of the distinctions between socialism and orthodox Marxism-Leninism that the CPI advocated. In 1934, as a result of the failure of second attempt at Civil Disobedience and disillusion with Gandhian methods and leadership amongst younger and more radical Congressmen, this led to the formation of the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) as a faction within the Indian National Congress.[26] Historically, the CPI had failed to capture Congress leadership, thus, leadership of the anti-colonial movement or even made them accept their programme due to the dominance of Gandhi’s personalities. Furthermore, this offered the CPI the possibility of infiltrating the left wing of Congress, who, in the historical context, was dissatisfied with the Government of India Act of 1935 which granted provincial autonomy with elected assemblies and cabinets in certain fields and also divided Congress in attitudes toward the Act.[27] Regarding external influence, it can be seen that these developments were becoming more beneficial towards the CPI.
As a result of the Seventh Congress in 1935, the Comintern advocated the notion of forming Popular Fronts and later advised by CPGB under Dutts and Bradley, which made possible for unity between anti-imperialist and anti-colonial forces in the colonies and could be seen as a recycling of the original line advocated by Lenin in 1920.[28] The CPI’s association with the CSP allowed it to gain significant grounds despite the former’s illegality via trade union activities, particularly the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) which by 1939, 22 members of the AICC were Communists.[29] Moreover, the CPI was able to expand their support base in West Bengal and further into south Kerala and Madras where it had no roots before.[30] Thereby, through this channel, this allowed the CPI to identify with the nationalist cause and to overcome their organisational inadequacies and strengthen their support base and legitimacy. However, their legitimacy within the independence movement was arguably fragile at times due to their susceptibility due to external development. In 1942, Achin Vanik argued that the CPI committed its biggest mistake by opposing the Congress-led Quit India Movement due to the entrance of the Soviet Union into the Second World War by this point.[31] Hence, this would have reduced their anti-British credential, particularly towards Nehru who had previously championed Communist causes, however, one must be aware this did not make the CPI anti-British as they undertook an intensive campaign when most of Congress leadership was imprisoned and concentrated their condemnation towards segments of the Indian nationalist movement that attempted to sabotage British war efforts or advocating collaboration with Japan.[32] Therefore, whilst still contributing to the independence movement, this contribution was limited by ideological orthodoxy and the complex nature of the war in relations to India despite growth in membership of the CPI during this period before independence was achieved in 1947.
In general, within the wider Indian independence movement, the role and influence of Communism can be assessed in two different ways, Communism in its organisational form as the CPI and Communism as an ideology in general. In regards to Communism in the form of the CPI, its role and influence were limited due to several factors. These factors included being their inability to recognise the pivotal role of the Indian National Congress and Gandhi to capture the leadership of the independence movement. Furthermore, organisational weaknesses forced the CPI to be dependent on Comintern and CPGB control, particular the former whose changes of course between 1929 and 1934 proved detrimental. Moreover, heavy government repression also exacerbated the organisational weaknesses and delay the formation of the CPI into a legitimate organisation until the outbreak of the Second World War. On the contrary, the repression, as shown by Meerut, also allowed Indian Communists to become part of the nationalist narrative. Communism as an ideology had a much bigger influence in the independence movement, in terms of impacting upon the thinking of independence leaders such as Nehru as shown by his European experiences. At the same time, Communism and other left-wing ideologies appealed to a younger generation of Indian nationalists such Bhagat Singh which in turns, increased support for the CPI, despite its shortcomings, in the late 1930s and early 1940s.
[1] M. R. Masani, The Communist Party of India- A Short Story (London: Derek Verschoyle, 1954), p. 20.
[2] Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 8.
[3] Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, p. 8
[4] V.I. Lenin, “Draft Theses on National and Colonial Questions for The Second Congress of The Communist International,” 5 June, 1920, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/jun/05.htm.
[5] “Original Draft of Supplementary Theses on the National and Colonial Question,” in Selected Works of M. N. Roy: Volume 1, 1917–1922, ed. Sibnarayan Ray (Dehli: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 167.
[6] Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, p. 31
[7] Ibid, p. 40.
[8] D.N. Dhanagare, Peasants movements in India, 1920–1950 (Oxford: null, 1983): pp. 130–131.
[9] Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, p. 49
[10] Dhanagare, Peasants movements, p. 131.
[11] Achin Vanaik, “The Indian Left,” New Left Review I, no. 159 (September-October 1986): p. 50.
[12] John Callaghan, “Rajani Palme Dutt, British communism, and the Communist Party of India,” Journal of Communist Studies 6, no. 1 (1990): p. 57.
[13] Dhanagare, Peasants movements, p. 131.
[14] Ibid, p. 132.
[15] Shashi Joshi, Struggle for Hegemony in India 1920–47: The Colonial State, the Left and the National Movement, Volume I: 1920–34 (New Dehli: Sage Publications, 1992): p. 123.
[16] John Callaghan, “Jawaharlal Nehru and the communist party,” Journal of Communist Studies 7, no. 3 (1991): p. 351.
[17] Jawaharlal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru: An Autobiography (New Dehli: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1980): p. 163.
[18] Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, p. 135.
[19] Callaghan, “Jawaharlal Nehru,” p. 352.
[20] Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, p. 137.
[21] Ibid, p. 138.
[22] Callaghan, “Jawaharlal Nehru,” p. 352.
[23] Bipan Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India (New Dehli: Orient Longman, 1981): p. 176.
[24] Joshi, Struggle for Hegemony, p. 152.
[25] Masani, The Communist Party of India, pp. 52–53.
[26] John Patrick Haithcox, “Left Wing Unity and the Indian Nationalist Movement: M.N. Roy and the Congress Socialist Party,” Modern Asian Studies 3, no. 1 (1969): pp. 18–19.
[27] Masani, The Communist Party of India, pp. 64–65.
[28]Callaghan, “Jawaharlal Nehru,” p. 353.
[29] Haithcox, “Left Wing Unity,” p. 34.
[30] Vanaik, “The Indian Left,” p. 51.
[31] Ibid, p.52.
[32] Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, p. 213.
Bibliography:
- Primary sources:
Lenin, V.I. “Draft Theses on National and Colonial Questions for The Second Congress Of The Communist International.” 5 June, 1920. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/jun/05.htm
Nehru, Jawaharlal. Jawaharlal Nehru: An Autobiography. New Dehli: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1980.
“Original Draft of the Supplementary Theses on the National and Colonial Question.” In Selected Works of M.N. Roy, Volume 1: 1917–1922, edited by Sibnarayan Ra, 165–178. Dehli: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Secondary sources:
Callaghan, John. “Jawaharlal Nehru and the communist party.” Journal of Communist Studies 7, no. 3 (1991): 350–356.
Callaghan, John. “Rajani Palme Dutts, British communism, and the Communist Party of India.” Journal of Communist Studies 6, no. 1 (1990): 49–70.
Chandra, Bipan. Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern Asia. New Dehli: Orient Longman, 1981.
Dhanagare, D. N. Peasant movements in India, 1920–1950. Oxford: 1983.
Haithcox, John Patrick. “Left Wing Unity and the Indian Nationalist Movement: M.N. Roy and the Congress Socialist Party.” Modern Asian Studies 3, no. 1 (1969): 17–56.
Joshi, Shashi. Struggle for Hegemony in India 1920–47: The Colonial State, the Left and the National Movement, Volume I: 1920–34. New Dehli: Sage Publications, 1992.
Masani, M.R. The Communist Party of India- A Short History. London: Derek Verschoyle, 1954.
Overstreet, Gene D. and Marhsall Windmiller. Communism in India. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959.
Vanaik, Achin. “The Indian Left.” New Left Review I, no. 159 (September-October 1986): 49–70.
